A Procurement Auction for Toxic Assets with Asymmetric Information
研究了2008年TARP拍卖中使用的参考价格拍卖机制，实验表明即使参考价格不准确，该机制也能有效避免逆向选择和策略性投标操纵，对多物品异质价值拍卖有参考意义。
The proposed 2008 TARP auction was intended to remove “toxic” assets from portfolios of financially stressed banks. The Treasury selected a design whereby bids to sell different securities would be normalized by “reference prices” that reflect relative value estimates. We conduct a series of experiments indicating that a simple Reference Price Auction can be an effective mechanism for avoiding serious effects of adverse selection and strategic bid manipulation, even with inaccurate reference prices. Beyond the TARP auction, our results are relevant to various multi-object auctions with value heterogeneity.