On the Heterogeneity of Leveraged Going Private Transactions
发现有两类业绩不佳的公司通过杠杆收购私有化：一类管理层持股少、易遭敌意收购；另一类管理层持股多、无此风险。两类公司的动机和收购后行为不同。
In contrast to previous literature, we argue that are two types of poorly performing firms going private through a leveraged buyout (LBO). One group consists of firms in which managers own an insignificant fraction of their firm's stock and are vulnerable to a hostile takeover. The other group consists of firms in which managers own a significant fraction of their firm's stock and so face little risk of hostile takeover. Our evidence indicates that there are two such groups of LBOs and that their motivations and posttransaction actions are different.