Consumption Commitments and Risk Preferences
在预期效用模型中引入消费承诺（需交易成本且调整频率低的商品），发现承诺会放大中等风险下的风险厌恶，同时促使人们参与高赔率赌博，从而解释中等风险与高风险下风险厌恶不一致以及保险购买者买彩票的谜题，并讨论了社会保险、税收政策、劳动供给和投资组合等应用。
Many households devote a large fraction of their budgets to "consumption commitments"—goods that involve transaction costs and are infrequently adjusted. This paper characterizes risk preferences in an expected utility model with commitments. We show that commitments affect risk preferences in two ways: (1) they amplify risk aversion with respect to moderate-stake shocks, and (2) they create a motive to take large-payoff gambles. The model thus helps resolve two basic puzzles in expected utility theory: the discrepancy between moderate-stake and large-stake risk aversion and lottery playing by insurance buyers. We discuss applications of the model such as the optimal design of social insurance and tax policies, added worker effects in labor supply, and portfolio choice. Using event studies of unemployment shocks, we document evidence consistent with the consumption adjustment patterns implied by the model.