Creditor Coordination, Liquidation Timing, and Debt Valuation
在连续时间结构模型中推导债务和股权的闭式解，分析债权人协调对债务、股权及公司价值的影响，并探讨破产法条款（如自动中止和优先权规则）如何影响福利。
Abstract This paper derives closed-form solutions for values of debt and equity in a continuous-time structural model in which the demands of creditors to be repaid cause a firm to be put into bankruptcy. This allows discussion of the effect of creditor coordination in recovering money on the values of debt, equity, and the firm, as well as on optimal capital structure. The effects of features of bankruptcy codes that prevent coordination failures between creditors, such as automatic stays and preference law, are also considered. The model suggests that such features, while preventing coordination failures, can decrease welfare.