Coordination Failures and the Lender of Last Resort: Was Bagehot Right after All?
为白芝浩关于央行应向“有清偿力但流动性不足”的银行放贷的观点提供了理论基础，证明即使在有效银行间市场中，有清偿力的银行也可能无法获得市场流动性援助。
The classical doctrine of the Lender of Last Resort, elaborated by Thornton (1802) and Bagehot (1873), asserts that the Central Bank should lend to "illiquid but solvent" banks under certain conditions. Several authors have argued that this view is now obsolete: when interbank markets are efficient, a solvent bank cannot be illiquid. This paper provides a possible theoretical foundation for rescuing Bagehot's view. Our theory does not rely on the multiplicity of equilibria that arises in classical models of bank runs. We build a model of banks' liquidity crises that possesses a unique Bayesian equilibrium. In this equilibrium, there is a positive probability that a solvent bank cannot find liquidity assistance in the market. We derive policy implications about banking regulation (solvency and liquidity ratios) and interventions of the Lender of Last Resort as well as on the disclosure policy of the Central Bank.