Sociopolitical Dynamics In Relations Between Top Managers and Security Analysts: Favor Rendering, Reciprocity, and Analyst Stock Recommendations
研究高层管理者如何通过施惠和互惠行为影响证券分析师的股票推荐，以及负面评级可能引发的报复行为，揭示社会政治过程在企业与分析师关系中的作用。
We examine how the disclosure of negative firm information may prompt top executives to render personal and professional favors for security analysts, who may reciprocate by rating firms relatively positively. We further examine how negative ratings may prompt executive negative reciprocity toward an analyst and how such retaliation may deter other analysts' negative ratings. Because analyst recommendations influence investor behavior, firm reputation, and access to capital, our theory and supportive findings suggest that corporate leaders enhance and perpetuate external support for their firms via social influence processes that develop and maintain social exchange relations with a key type of external constituent.