DISTRIBUTIONAL INCENTIVES IN AN EQUILIBRIUM MODEL OF DOMESTIC SOVEREIGN DEFAULT
构建了一个国内主权违约理论模型，研究债务持有集中度如何影响政府违约决策和债务可持续性，发现违约成本与债务持有结构是关键因素。
Europe's debt crisis resembles historical episodes of outright default on domestic public debt about which little research exists. This paper proposes a theory of domestic sovereign default based on distributional incentives affecting the welfare of risk-averse debt and nondebtholders. A utilitarian government cannot sustain debt if default is costless. If default is costly, debt with default risk is sustainable, and debt falls as the concentration of debt ownership rises. A government favoring bond holders can also sustain debt, with debt rising as ownership becomes more concentrated. These results are robust to adding foreign investors, redistributive taxes, or a second asset.