Rivalry Deterrence In International Markets: Contingencies Governing The Mutual Forbearance Hypothesis
研究了多市场接触假说在跨国公司中的适用性，发现子公司所有权、文化距离、东道国监管限制和本地竞争者会调节多市场接触对竞争的抑制作用，对全球汽车行业数据的分析支持了假设。
The mutual forbearance hypothesis states that when the same competitors meet in multiple markets, rivalry is deterred. Our study highlights how pressures for local responsiveness impact the veracity of this hypothesis for multinational corporations (MNCs) in host countries. We develop theory to explain how subsidiary ownership, home-host cultural distance, host country regulatory restrictions on MNC activities, and the presence of local competitors affect the rivalry-dampening impact of multi-market contact. We tested our hypotheses with a sample of 13 global automobile companies operating in 27 countries and report strong support for our hypotheses.