An Economic Analysis of a Drug-Selling Gang's Finances
基于一个贩毒街头帮派的独特财务数据，分析其工资、风险和激励结构，发现经济因素不足以解释个人参与帮派或帮派行为。
We use a unique data set detailing the �nancial activities of a drug-selling street gang to analyze gang economics. On average, earnings in the gang are somewhat above the legitimate labor market alternative. The enormous risks of drug selling, however, more than offset this small wage premium. Compensation within the gang is highly skewed, and the prospect of future riches, not current wages, is the primary economic motivation. The gang engages in repeated gang wars and sometimes prices below marginal cost. Our results suggest that economic factors alone are unlikely to adequately explain individual participation in the gang or gang behavior. Street gangs have a long history in American cities {Thrasher 1927}. Until recently, gangs were organized primarily as social peer groups. Any economic activities were of secondary importance {Suttles 1968; Klein 1995}. The last two decades, however, have given rise to a dramatic transformation in street gangs, or what Taylor {1990} terms their ‘‘corporatization.’ ’ When crack became widely available in the mid-1980s, sold in small quantities in fragmented street-corner markets, street gangs became the logical distributors. The potential pro�t in drug dealing dwarfed that previously available to gangs through other criminal channels. As a consequence, gangs became systematically involved in the distribution of various narcotic substances including heroin and crack-cocaine {Block and Block 1993}. Recent academic literature on gangs has examined some aspects of their �nancial activities. Hagedorn {1988} and Padilla {1992} suggest that gang members pursue �nancial activities in response to alienation from legitimate labor markets. Jankowski’s {1991} study of 37 gangs found that nearly all of them had an expressed commitment to illicit revenue generation, but that * We would like to thank Autry Harrison for his assistance on the project,