Modes of Communication
构建了一个有成本的沟通理论，分析发送者和接收者的动机与能力如何内生决定沟通模式及知识传递，探讨激励对齐、议题相关沟通与可信度线索的互补/替代关系，以及沟通的路径依赖性。
The paper develops a theory of costly communication in which the sender's and receiver's motivations and abilities endogenously determine the communication mode and the transfer of knowledge. Communication is modeled as a problem of moral hazard in teams, in which the sender and receiver select persuasion and message elaboration efforts. The model is shown to provide a rich set of insights concerning (i) the impact of incentive alignment on communication strategies, (ii) the relative influence and the complementarity/substitutability between issue-relevant communication and cues (information that relates to the credibility of the sender rather than to the issue at stake), and (iii) the path dependency of communication.