Discount Schedules and Grower Incentives in Grain Marketing
建立了一个微观经济优化模型，分析粮食仓库在面临不同折扣计划时的清理与混合决策，并利用小麦仓库记录检验替代折扣计划是否能为仓库提供重组粮食成分的成本覆盖机会。
Abstract In this paper we develop a microeconomic optimization model of grain elevator cleaning and commingling decisions when the firm is faced with different discounting schedules. Using generalizations of Jensen's inequality, it is shown that a convex (concave) discount schedule encourages commingling (cleaning). However, a separate market for cleanings may qualitatively alter the optimal arrangement of grain. Wheat elevator records are studied to discern whether alternative discount schedules provide elevators with opportunities to cover the costs of rearranging grain composition. Rearrangement activities appear to be marginally profitable for some dockage levels.