Raids, Rewards, and Reputations in the Market for Managerial Talent
研究发现，跳槽到新公司担任CEO的高管来自股价表现高于平均水平的公司，且这一关系在更资深的高管中更明显；股票期权和限制性股票对跳槽影响不大，但存在“继承人”会增加高管跳槽到非CEO职位的可能性。
We find that executives who jump to chief executive officer (CEO) positions at new employers come from firms that exhibit aboveaverage stock price performance. This relationship is more pronounced for more senior executives. No such relationship exists for jumps to non-CEO positions. Stock options and restricted stock do not appear to significantly affect the likelihood of jumping ship, but the existence of an "heir apparent" on the management team increases the likelihood that executives will leave for non-CEO positions elsewhere. Hiring grants used to attract managers are correlated with the equity position forfeited at the prior employer and with the prior employer's performance. Copyright 2003, Oxford University Press.