欺骗自己:逃税的经济学

Cheating Ourselves: The Economics of Tax Evasion

Journal of Economic Perspectives · 2007
被引 1163 · 同刊同年前 9%
人大 A-ABS 4

中文导读

综述了逃税的规模、性质和决定因素,重点分析美国所得税,并探讨相关模型、理论及政策含义,帮助理解为何即使有法律惩罚,逃税仍普遍存在。

Abstract

No government can announce a tax system and then rely on taxpayers' sense of duty to remit what is owed. Some dutiful people will undoubtedly pay what they owe, but many others will not. Over time the ranks of the dutiful will shrink, as they see how they are being taken advantage of by the others. Thus, paying taxes must be made a legal responsibility of citizens, with penalties attendant on noncompliance. But even in the face of those penalties, substantial tax evasion exists. Tax evasion is widespread, always has been, and probably always will be. This essay reviews what is known about the magnitude, nature, and determinants of tax evasion, with an emphasis on the U.S. income tax. It then places this information into a conceptual context, examining various models and theories, and considers policy implications.

逃税税收遵从税收执法所得税