Behavioral Heterogeneity in U.S. Inflation Dynamics
构建并估计了一个包含两类企业（基本面分析者和随机游走信奉者）的通胀动态行为模型，允许企业根据预测表现切换策略，发现行为异质性和进化学习机制显著，且前瞻与后向行为的权重随时间变化。
In this article we develop and estimate a behavioral model of inflation dynamics with heterogeneous firms. In our stylized framework there are two groups of price setters, fundamentalists and random walk believers. Fundamentalists are forward-looking in the sense that they believe in a present-value relationship between inflation and real marginal costs, while random walk believers are backward-looking, using the simplest rule of thumb, naive expectations, to forecast inflation. Agents are allowed to switch between these different forecasting strategies conditional on their recent relative forecasting performance. We estimate the switching model using aggregate and survey data. Our results support behavioral heterogeneity and the significance of evolutionary learning mechanism. We show that there is substantial time variation in the weights of forward-looking and backward-looking behavior. Although on average the majority of firms use the simple backward-looking rule, the market has phases in which it is dominated by either the fundamentalists or the random walk believers.