Electoral Competition Under the Threat of Political Unrest
研究当一方政党能制造政治动荡时，信息如何影响选举结果：信息越少，强势政党越易胜选；信息充分时弱势政党可通过中间派政策防止动荡，而威胁可信度不确定时会导致政策分化。
We study elections in which one party (the strong party) controls a source of political unrest; e.g., this party could instigate riots if it lost the election. We show that the strong party is more likely to win the election when there is less information about its ability to cause unrest. This is because when the weak party is better informed, it can more reliably prevent political unrest by implementing a "centrist" policy. When there is uncertainty over the credibility of the threat, "posturing" by the strong party leads to platform divergence.