Lobbying and Welfare in a Representative Democracy
结合公民候选人模型和菜单拍卖模型，分析游说对政治竞争和政策结果的影响，发现游说可能因协调失败导致帕累托低效政策，并因创造职位租金引发过度参选。
This paper studies the impact of lobbying on political competition and policy outcomes in a framework which integrates the citizen-candidate model of representative democracy with the menu-auction model of lobbying. Positive and normative issues are analysed. On the positive side, lobbying need have little or no effect on policy outcomes because voters can restrict the influence of lobbyists by supporting candidates with offsetting policy preferences. On the normative side, coordination failure among lobbyists can result in Pareto inefficient policy choices. In addition, by creating rents to holding office, lobbying can lead to "excessive" entry into electoral competition.