Managerial Career Concerns and Investments in Information
研究职业关注如何影响风险中性管理者在投资前学习项目的决策，发现当项目收益仅对已接受项目可观察时，管理者会过度投资于项目评估精度。
We extend the “implicit incentives” literature by analyzing how career concerns affect a riskneutral manager’s decision about how much to learn about a project before investing in it. The manager has unknown ability that determines the probability with which a good project is available, so the market updates ability assessments from project outcomes. While project choice is efficient in equilibrium, an unobservable investment in the precision of project evaluation allows the manager to control the probabilities of future reputational states. This distorts his investment in precision above first best when project payoffs can be observed only on accepted projects.