Board Seat Accumulation by Executives: A Shareholder's Perspective
研究高管接受外部董事席位对公司价值的影响，发现只有在代理问题严重的公司中，这一行为才会导致负面市场反应；反之则提升企业价值，对股东和监管政策有启示。
ABSTRACT While reformers have argued that multiple directorships for executives can destroy value, we investigate firms with executives that accept an outside directorship and find negative announcement returns only when the executive's firm has greater agency problems. When fewer agency concerns exist, additional directorships relate to increased firm value. Announcement returns are also higher when executives accept an outside directorship in a financial, high‐growth, or related‐industry firm. Our results suggest that outside directorships for executives can enhance firm value, which has important implications for firms employing executives nominated for outside boards and for policy recommendations restricting the number of directorships.