Is it Harmful to Allow Partial Cooperation?
研究了部分合作（即只与部分代理人合作）是否比完全不合作更糟糕，发现战略溢出效应的性质是关键因素，并应用于行业工资谈判和地方公共品等例子。
In economics, politics and society, examples abound in economics, politics and society where agents can enter partial cooperation schemes, i.e., they can collude with a subset of agents. Several contributions devoted to specific settings have claimed that such partial cooperation actually worsens welfare compared to the no‐cooperation situation. Our paper assesses this view by highlighting the forces that lead to such results. We find that the nature of strategic spillovers is central to determining whether partial cooperation is bad. Our propositions are then applied to various examples as industry wage bargaining or local public goods.