Land Heterogeneity, Agricultural Income Forgone and Environmental Benefit: An Assessment of Incentive Compatibility Problems in Environmental Stewardship Schemes
研究了环境管理计划中基于农业收入损失的激励支付，因土地异质性导致环境产品和服务供给偏离社会最优水平的问题。
Abstract This paper examines the issue of incentive compatibility within environmental stewardship schemes, where incentive payments to farmers to provide environmental goods and services are based on foregone agricultural income. The particular focus of the paper is land heterogeneity, either of agricultural or environmental value, leading to divergence between the actual and socially optimal level of provision of environmental goods and services. Given land heterogeneity, such goods and services are likely to be systematically over‐ or under‐provided in response to a flat rate payment for income foregone.