Reputation and Hierarchy in Dynamic Models of Employment
构建了一个重复博弈模型，将员工能力和行为作为私人信息，结合逆向选择和道德风险，发现均衡合同结构是有限等级的层级制，声誉可替代非自愿失业作为纪律机制，晋升比保证金更有效。
The employment relationship with employees' ability and their actions, both private information (thus combining adverse selection with moral hazard), is modeled as a repeated game with self-enforcing contracts being perfect Bayesian-Nash equilibria. Under termination contracts, the equilibrium contract structure consists of a hierarchy of ranks, finite in number even though ability is continuous. Reputation acts as an effective device for worker discipline without the need for involuntary unemployment. Selection by bonding is not, in general, incentive compatible, but selection by promotion of employees through the ranks is. Many other features correspond to observed employment structures. Copyright 1988 by University of Chicago Press.