Fool's Gold: Social Proof in the Initiation and Abandonment of Coverage by Wall Street Analysts
研究证券分析师在启动和放弃对纳斯达克上市公司覆盖时，社会证明如何导致信息级联，使分析师模仿同行启动覆盖，但随后因高估盈利而更可能放弃覆盖，形成模仿、失望、放弃的循环。
This paper examines the dynamics of social influence in the choices of securities analysts to initiate and abandon coverage of firms listed on the NASDAQ national market. We show that social proof—using the actions of others to infer the value of a course of action—creates information cascades in which decision makers initiate coverage of a firm when peers have recently begun coverage. Analysts that initiate coverage of a firm in the wake of a cascade are particularly prone to overestimating the firm's future profitability, however, and they are subsequently more likely than other analysts to abandon coverage of the firm. We thus find evidence for a cycle of imitation-driven choice followed by disappointment and abandonment. Our account suggests that institutionalization rooted in imitation is likely to be fragile.