From ultimatum to Nash bargaining: Theory and experimental evidence
研究了一个两阶段讨价还价博弈，其中第一行动者提出要求时只知道第二行动者以一定概率获知该信息；实验表明双方的要求随信息传递概率变化，与理论预测一致。
Abstract We consider a sequential two-party bargaining game with uncertain information transmission. When the first mover states her demand she does only know the probability with which the second mover will be informed about it. The informed second mover can either accept or reject the offer and payoffs are determined as in the ultimatum game. Otherwise the uninformed second mover states his own demand and payoffs are determined as in the Nash demand game. In the experiment we vary the commonly known probability of information transmission. Our main finding is that first movers’ and uninformed second movers’ demands adjust to this probability as qualitatively predicted, that is, first movers’ (uninformed second movers’) demands are lower (higher) the lower the probability of information transmission.