The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government
用一个简单模型分析官员问责制的利弊：问责制让公众监督官员，但也可能使官员迎合民意而忽视少数群体福利。研究决策权应分配给公众、可问责官员还是不可问责官员。
We build a simple model to capture the major virtues and drawbacks of making public officials accountable (i.e., subjecting them to reelection): On the one hand, accountability allows the public to screen and discipline their officials; on the other, it may induce those officials to pander to public opinion and put too little weight on minority welfare. We study when decision-making powers should be allocated to the public directly (direct democracy), to accountable officials (called “politicians”), or to nonaccountable officials (called “judges”).