Identifying Moral Hazard in Car Insurance Contracts
利用以色列雇主提供汽车保险的特殊情况，通过工具变量分析发现，事故成本每降低100美元，事故概率上升1.7个百分点，揭示了道德风险对事故率的影响。
This paper capitalizes on a unique situation in Israel where car insurance coverage is often distributed as a benefit by employers. In our sample, employer-determined coverage resulted in an average $235 discount in accident costs. Using instrumental variable analysis on data provided by an insurance firm in Israel (2001–2008), we find that each $100 reduction in accident costs results in a 1.7 percentage point increase in the probability of an accident. At an average accident rate of 16.3 percent, this 10 percent increase in auto accidents can be interpreted as the effect of moral hazard on car accidents.