Intrinsic Motivation in Public Service: Theory and Evidence from State Supreme Courts
研究了州上诉法院法官的内在偏好，发现当时间压力减小（如设立中级上诉法院、选举压力减弱或薪资提高）时，法官会写出研究更充分、被引用更多的判决意见，表明他们内在有动力追求高质量而非数量。
This paper provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of the intrinsic preferences of state appellate court judges. We construct a panel data set using published decisions from all state supreme courts from 1947 to 1994. We estimate the effects of changes in judges’ employment conditions on a number of measures of judicial performance. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that judges are intrinsically motivated to provide high-quality decisions and that at the margin they prefer quality over quantity. When judges face less time pressure—whether from the introduction of an intermediate appellate court, the weakening of electoral demands, or an increased salary—they write more well-researched opinions that are cited more often by other judges. These effects are strongest when judges have more discretion to select their portfolios of cases.