Information Goods vs. Industrial Goods: Cost Structure and Competition
研究信息商品市场与传统工业商品市场的差异，发现信息商品市场缺乏细分，垄断者只提供单一产品，竞争导致高度集中，领先企业即使面临自由进入也无网络效应，行为接近垄断。
We study markets for information goods and find that they differ significantly from markets for traditional industrial goods. Markets for information goods in which products are vertically differentiated lack the segmentation inherent in markets for industrial goods. As a result, a monopoly will offer only a single product. Competition leads to highly concentrated information-good markets, with the leading firm behaving almost like a monopoly even with free entry and without network effects. We study how the structure of the firms' cost functions drives our results. This paper was accepted by Barrie R. Nault, information systems.