Wage Rigidity, Implicit Contracts, Unemployment, and Economic Efficiency
研究非自愿失业与隐性合同理论，分析隐性合同在何种条件下会导致失业，并构建一般均衡模型探讨信息、执行和复杂性对合同可行集的限制。
This article examines the theory of involuntary unemployment and implicit contracts. Furthermore, the article is concerned with identifying the circumstances under which implicit contracts will give rise to unemployment even though involuntary unemployment has been often attributed to wage rigidities generated by implicit contracts by themselves. Moreover, a simple, general equilibrium model and the three sources of restrictions on the set of feasible contracts: (1) information; (2) enforcement; and (3) complexity. Finally, it is concluded that implicit contracts can then provide an explanation of unemployment.