Government Revenues and Economic Growth in Weakly Institutionalised States
提出政治不稳定效应：更多政府收入会加剧精英权力斗争、缩短执政者时间视野，从而减少对促进增长的长期公共品的投资，解释了贫困国家为何难以实现持续增长。
The lack of sustained growth in poor countries has often been attributed to 'fiscal weakness'. Empirical evidence suggests that governments often fail to provide crucial public goods. I argue that this failure may be the result of a political instability effect: more resources fuel power struggles among competing elites - and decrease the incumbent regime's time horizon in office. But with a shorter time horizon, it is less attractive to finance growth-promoting institutions whose returns only accrue in the future. The model further predicts the instability effect to be stronger in countries with little capital or in remote places which render technology adoption expensive. Copyright © The Author(s). Journal compilation © Royal Economic Society 2010.