Remapping the Fiscal State After the Global Financial Crisis
探讨了全球金融危机后，国家如何通过推动经济监控系统的相互渗透来增强监管能力，并以打击离岸税收逃避为例，解释了强国如何通过单边、双边和多边渠道收回逃税并强制避税地遵守全球透明度标准。
abstract The global financial crisis (GFC) refocuses attention on the capacity of states to regulate global finance. In this article, I argue that states are augmenting their regulatory capacity by promoting the interpenetration of national economic surveillance systems. I develop this argument by exploring the recent efforts of powerful states to address a particular form of offshore regulatory escape: tax evasion. Previous analyses of offshore processes have been framed by strong assumptions about the geographic domains of states and markets. I present a new analytic framework that weakens these geographic assumptions and explains why some states are more able than others to address offshore tax evasion through unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral channels. The framework is applied to explain the mechanisms through which powerful states have reclaimed evaded taxes and forced global transparency standards on tax havens after the GFC. I conclude that the regulatory changes brought about by recent attacks on tax havens constitute an important remapping of the fiscal state. These attacks provide an interesting case study of the ways in which states are augmenting their capacity to regulate a range of cross‐border financial flows.