IMPERFECTLY INFORMED VOTERS AND STRATEGIC EXTREMISM
研究了选民通过利益集团或媒体背书等捷径推断候选人政策立场时，候选人策略性地走向极端，其收敛或分化取决于选民在政策无差异时的投票规则。
We analyze a two‐candidate Downsian model considering that voters use shortcuts (e.g., interest‐group/media endorsements) to infer candidates' policy platforms. That is, voters do not observe candidates' exact platforms but only which candidate offers the more leftist/rightist platform (relative positions). In equilibrium, candidates' behavior tends to maximum extremism, but it may converge or diverge depending on how voters behave when indifferent policywise between the candidates. When the tie‐breaking rule used by the voters is sufficiently fair, candidates converge to the extreme preferred by the median voter, but when it strongly favors a certain candidate, each candidate specializes in a different extreme.