Co‐managers, Information, and the Secondary Market Liquidity of Initial Public Offerings
研究发现承销团中共同经理人数量越多，IPO的买卖价差越小、逆向选择成本越低、知情交易概率越低，表明共同经理人通过信息服务改善了IPO流动性。
We provide evidence that co‐managers improve initial public offering (IPO) liquidity through the “information” services they provide. Based on a sample of IPOs completed from January 1993 to December 2005, we find that a high number of co‐managers in the syndicate are associated with a lower spread, lower adverse selection costs, and a lower probability of informed trading. Moreover, increases in the offer price revision, in co‐managers’ underwriting rank, and in the number of analyst recommendations are all associated with the improvement in liquidity. This evidence is consistent with the hypotheses that co‐managers’ premarket and postmarket services mitigate information risk in the aftermarket.