Start-Up Finance, Monitoring, and Collusion
研究企业家、风险投资家和其他投资者之间的最优金融契约，通过分配现金流权和控制权来激励风险投资家有效监督、确保中期项目续投决策正确，并防止风险投资家与企业家合谋损害其他投资者。
I examine optimal financial contracts between entrepreneurs, financial intermediaries (venture capitalists) and other investors, which allocate both cashflow rights and control rights to (a) motivate the venture capitalist to monitor effectively the entrepreneur; (b) ensure that the efficient decision is taken at the interim stage concerning project continuation and refinancing; and (c) deter collusion between the entrepreneur and the venture capital-ist at the expense of the other investors. The combination of asymmetric information at the interim stage with the possibility of collusion yields op-timal (collusion-proof) contracts that are consistent with several commonly observed characteristics of venture capital financing. ∗University of Toulouse (IDEI and GREMAQ); dessi@cict.fr. I am especially grateful to Jean Tirole, two anonymous referees and the Editor, Joseph Har-rington, for many helpful comments. I would also like to thank Stefan Arping, Bruno Biais,