Evolution, Teamwork and Collective Action: Production Targets in the Private Provision of Public Goods
研究在时间演化中，公共物品私人供给的生产函数形状如何影响均衡选择，发现最优函数在努力低于阈值时无产出，高于阈值则充分利用生产可能性边界，且阈值由仅享受私人收益的个体意愿决定。
Collective-action problems arise when private actions generate common consequences; for example, the private provision of a public good. This article asks: what shapes of public-good production function work well when play evolves over time, and hence moves between equilibria? Welfare-maximising public-good production functions yield nothing when combined efforts fall below some threshold but otherwise maximally exploit the production-possibility frontier. They generate multiple equilibria: coordinated teamwork is integral to successful collective actions. Optimal thresholds correspond to the output that individuals who pay all private costs but enjoy only private benefits would be just willing to provide. Copyright © The Author(s). Journal compilation © Royal Economic Society 2009.