Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow and the Effect of Shareholder Rights on the Implied Cost of Equity Capital
研究了股东权利对降低权益资本成本的作用，以及自由现金流代理问题如何影响这一作用。发现股东权利强的公司隐含权益成本更低，且该效应在代理问题严重的公司中更显著。
Abstract In this paper, we examine the effect of shareholder rights on reducing the cost of equity and the impact of agency problems from free cash flow (FCF) on this effect. We find that firms with strong shareholder rights have a significantly lower implied cost of equity after controlling for risk factors, price momentum, analysts’ forecast biases, and industry and year effects than do firms with weak shareholder rights. Further analysis shows that the effect of shareholder rights on reducing the cost of equity is significantly stronger for firms with more severe agency problems from FCFs.