Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends
提出两种基于代理成本的股利解释，探讨股利是否有助于协调经理人与股东的利益，并指出最优股利政策应最小化资本、代理和税收成本之和。
The economic literature about dividends usually assumes that managers are perfect agents of investors, and it seeks to determine why these agents pay dividends. Other literature about the firm assumes that managers are imperfect agents and inquires how managers' interests may be aligned with shareholders' interests. These two lines of inquiry rarely meet.' Yet logically any dividend policy (or any other corporate policy) should be designed to minimize the sum of capital, agency, and taxation costs. The purpose of this paper is to ask whether dividends are a method of aligning managers' interests with those of investors. It offers agency-cost explanations of dividends.