Government Outsourcing: Public Contracting with Private Monopoly
研究政府预算约束如何影响对自然垄断的规制，提出政府外包作为替代方案，允许企业自由进入市场，政府事后与私人企业签约，以应对技术不确定性。
The article studies the impact of the government budget constraint on the regulation of natural monopolies in adverse selection contexts. The government maximises total surplus but incurs some cost of public funds à la Laffont and Tirole (1993). Government outsourcing is proposed as an alternative to regulation in which firms freely enter the market and choose their prices and output levels. However government can contract ex post with the private firms. This ex post contracting set-up allows more flexibility than regulation where governments commit to both investment and operation cash-flows. This is especially relevant in case of high technological uncertainties.