Robust Bilateral Trade and Mediated Bargaining
研究信息不完全下双边贸易的中介谈判，提出稳健均衡概念，证明中介能促进效率，适合关注谈判机制设计的学者。
We consider bilateral trade problems subject to incomplete information on the reservation values of the agents. We address negotiations where the communication of proposals takes place through the filter of a third party, a mediator: traders submit proposals over continuous time to themediator that receives bids and keeps them secret until they are compatible. A regular robust equilibrium (RRE) is an (undominated) ex post equilibriumwhere (with sufficient delay) all compatible traders reach agreement. We present a characterization of RRE for risk-neutral traders that discount the future at the same exponential rate. We show how to compute RRE strategy profiles, andwe explicitly display the unique onewhere agreements split the net surplus in equal shares. Our results support the claim that bargaining through a mediator is an effective procedure to promote efficiency. 1.