Homeownership, Community Interactions, and Segregation
研究发现，即使偏好和能力相同，人们也会因房屋所有权激励的差异而自发形成社区隔离：房主社区环境良好，而租户社区功能失调。该模型解释了美国住房所有权隔离现象，并评估了促进融合的税收补贴政策。
We show that individuals with identical preferences and abilities can self-organize into communities with starkly different civic environments. Specifically, we consider a multi-community city where community quality depends upon residents' efforts to prevent crime, improve local governance, etc. Homeownership raises incentives for such civic efforts, but is beyond the reach of the poor. Within-community externalities lead to segregated cities: the rich reside in healthy homeowner communities, while the poor live in dysfunctional renter communities. Tenure segregation in the United States accords well with our prediction. We study alternative tax-subsidy policies to expand homeownership and to promote integration of homeowners and renters.