The Logic of Political Violence
提出一个统一框架研究政治暴力（压制或内战），通过模型分析政治和经济因素如何驱动单边或双边暴力，并利用国家内部数据发现暴力与工资和援助冲击相关，且仅当政治制度非凝聚时成立。
This article offers a unified approach for studying political violence whether it emerges as repression or civil war. We formulate a model where an incumbent or opposition can use violence to maintain or acquire power to study which political and economic factors drive one-sided or two-sided violence (repression or civil war). The model predicts a hierarchy of violence states from peace via repression to civil war; and suggests a natural empirical approach. Exploiting only within-country variation in the data, we show that violence is associated with shocks that can affect wages and aid. As in the theory, these effects are only present where political institutions are noncohesive. Copyright 2011, Oxford University Press.