Pattern Bargaining and Wage Leadership in a Small Open Economy*
研究了欧洲常见的以制造业为工资领导的模式谈判，发现通胀目标制下所有模式谈判结果与无协调谈判相同，而在货币联盟中非贸易部门领导更有利于工资克制。
Abstract Pattern bargaining with the tradables (manufacturing) sector as the wage leader is common in Europe. We question the conventional wisdom that such bargaining produces wage restraint. In our model, all forms of pattern bargaining give the same outcomes as uncoordinated bargaining under inflation targeting. Under a monetary union, wage leadership for the non‐tradables sector is conducive to wage restraint, whereas wage leadership for the tradables sector is not. Comparison thinking might lead the follower to set the same wage as the leader. Such equilibria can arise when the leader sector is the smaller sector, and these can promote high employment.