Discriminatory Information Disclosure
研究卖方如何通过向不同买方类型披露不同数量的额外信息来提高收入，发现歧视性信息披露优于完全披露，并指出正交分解技术在信息披露设计中通常无效。
A seller designs a mechanism to sell a single object to a potential buyer whose private type is his incomplete information about his valuation. The seller can disclose additional information to the buyer about his valuation without observing its realization. In both discrete-type and continuous-type settings, we show that discriminatory disclosure—releasing different amounts of additional information to different buyer types—dominates full disclosure in terms of seller revenue. An implication is that the orthogonal decomposition technique, while an important tool in dynamic mechanism design, is generally invalid when information disclosure is part of the design.