Chief Executive Officer Careers in Regulated Environments: Evidence from Electric and Gas Utilities
比较了电力燃气公用事业企业与无监管企业CEO的差异，发现公用事业CEO上任年龄更大、教育背景略逊、更可能有法律背景，但其更替对股票业绩的敏感度不低于无监管企业CEO，且监管经验在选拔中受重视。
We compare chief executive officers (CEOs) of electric and gas utility firms with CEOs of unregulated firms. Utility CEOs tend to be older when appointed to office, have less‐prestigious educational backgrounds, and are more likely to have a legal background. Despite these differences, the evidence indicates that the likelihood of utility CEO turnover is at least as sensitive to stock performance as the likelihood of turnover among CEOs of unregulated firms. We find no convincing evidence that utility CEOs stay in office longer than their unregulated counterparts, although they are less likely to be overtly forced from office or replaced by an executive from outside the firm. Finally, the evidence suggests that regulatory expertise is valued in the selection of new utility CEOs.