Does Opinion Shopping Impair Auditor Independence and Audit Quality?
研究公司以解雇威胁和意见购买行为对审计师独立性和审计质量的影响，发现审计师独立性未受损害，继任审计师质量更高，且市场反应降低了意见购买的收益。
This study investigates how companies' threats to dismiss auditors and their engagement in opinion shopping influence auditor independence and audit quality, which in turn affect misstatements in financial statements. It also examines how outsiders' reactions to auditor switching influence opinion shopping. The results indicate that neither the predecessor auditor's nor the successor auditor's independence is compromised by dismissal threats and opinion shopping. Further, the successor auditor's audit quality exceeds the predecessor auditor's audit quality. In addition, auditor switching decreases potential understatements and increases potential overstatements in financial statements, and the capital market's and the successor auditor's reactions to auditor switching reduce the benefits of opinion shopping to companies. Additionally, the study sheds some light on the potential effects of both the Sarbanes‐Oxley's restriction on non‐audit services and mandatory auditor rotation or retention. The paper also derives a rich set of empirical implications.