Earnings Instability and Tenure
利用意大利临时雇佣合同改革造成的不同世代工人平均任期差异，研究发现每增加一年任期可使收入不稳定性降低11%，且临时工的不稳定性比永久工高出100%。
Abstract We study the effect of tenure on earnings instability in Italy using the reforms of temporary employment contracts, which affected the average tenure of workers differentially across cohorts. We develop a model of earnings dynamics, and we exploit the variation of tenure and instability over time and across birth cohorts to estimate policy‐relevant parameters. Our results indicate that each year of tenure on the job reduces earnings instability by 11 percent; the drop is faster in the first three years of the match. Workers on a temporary contract have an earnings instability up to 100 percent higher than workers on a permanent contract.