Efficiency in Auctions with Private and Common Values: An Experimental Study
通过一系列一级价格拍卖实验，测量当物品预期价值同时依赖私人信息和共同信息时的效率损失，发现受试者虽受赢者诅咒影响，但信息权重与理性投标人相近，实际效率接近理论预测。
Auctions are generally not efficient when the object's expected value depends on private and common value information. We report a series of first-price auction experiments to measure the degree of inefficiency that occurs with financially motivated bidders. While some subjects fall prey to the winner's curse, they weigh their private and common value information in roughly the same manner as rational bidders, with observed efficiencies close to predicted levels. Increased competition and reduced uncertainty about the common value positively affect revenues and efficiency. The public release of information about the common value also raises efficiency, although less than predicted.