POST‐CARTEL PRICING DURING LITIGATION
研究发现美国反垄断损害赔偿的标准计算方法会激励企业在卡特尔解散后定价高于非合谋水平，导致“但为价格”被高估、损害赔偿被低估，且卡特尔存续时间越长、行业越集中，偏差越大。
Standard methods in the U.S. for calculating antitrust damages in price‐fixing cases are shown to create a strategic incentive for firms to price above the non‐collusive price after the cartel has been dissolved. This results in an overestimate of the but for price and an underestimate of the level of damages. The extent of this upward bias in the but for price is greater, the longer the cartel was in place and the more concentrated the industry.