Intertemporal Price Cap Regulation Under Uncertainty
研究不确定性下对拥有市场势力的企业实施跨期价格上限管制的影响。确定性下可实现竞争结果，但不确定性下即使最优设定也会导致投资不足和数量配给。
This paper examines the intertemporal price cap regulation of a firm that has market power. Under uncertainty, the unconstrained firm 'waits longer' before investing or adding to capacity and as a corollary, enjoys higher prices over time than would be observed in an equivalent competitive industry. In the certainty case, the imposition of an inter-temporal price cap can be used to realise the competitive market solution; by contrast, under uncertainty, it cannot. Even if the price cap is optimally chosen, under uncertainty, the monopoly firm will generally (a) under-invest and (b) impose quantity rationing on its customers. Copyright 2004 Royal Economic Society.