Perpetual Leapfrogging in Bertrand Duopoly
研究伯特兰双寡头企业无限期技术采纳决策的模式，分析何种条件下均衡导致持续领先或交替蛙跳，发现只有蛙跳能带来长期技术进步，且需求条件决定蛙跳能否永久持续。
We consider different patterns of infinite technological adoption choices by firms in a Bertrand duopoly. Every period technological progress provides a sequence of cost reducing innovations. The equilibrium concept is Markov perfect equilibrium. We analyze conditions for which equilibrium adoption leads to persistent leadership and those where firms alternate in adoption inducing leapfrogging. Only leapfrogging leads to technological improvement in the long run. Demand conditions play a crucial role in determining whether leapfrogging can be perpetual in Bertrand duopoly.