Monotone Equilibrium in Multi-Unit Auctions
证明在双边多单位拍卖中，当竞拍者风险中性且具有独立多维类型和相互依赖价值时，存在单调纯策略均衡，且所有混合策略均衡在事后配置和中间预期支付上等价于单调均衡。
In two-sided multi-unit auctions having a variety of payment rules, including uniform-price and discriminatory auctions, a monotone pure-strategy equilibrium (MPSE) exists when bidders are risk neutral with independent multi-dimensional types and interdependent values. In fact, all mixed-strategy equilibria are ex post allocation and interim expected payment equivalent to MPSE. Thus, for standard expected surplus/revenue analysis, there is no loss restricting attention to monotone strategies. Copyright 2006, Wiley-Blackwell.